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ABSTRACT 
Government Weakness and Electoral Cycles in Local Public Debt: 
Evidence from Flemish Municipalities  
by Benny Geys * 
Empirical research on Political Business (and Budget) Cycles is more 
supportive for electoral cycles in policies than in macro-economic outcomes. 
But even pre-electoral policy cycles receive no unanimous confirmation. In the 
present paper, we give credence to recent arguments that this may be due to 
the disregard for the political, economic and institutional context in which 
politicians make policy decisions. Specifically, we argue that the level of political 
fragmentation of the government affects both the need for and possibility to 
engage in opportunistic policy cycles. An analysis of local public debt data for 
296 Flemish municipalities provides empirical support for this contention. 
 
Keywords: Political Budget Cycles, local public debt, political fragmentation, elections, 
municipalities 
JEL Classification: E62, H72, H74 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Regierungsschwäche und Wahlzyklen in Zeiten kommunaler 
Verschuldung: das Beispiel flämischer Kommunen  
Ergebnisse empirischer Forschung zum Thema regierungspolitischer und 
Budgetzyklen unterstützen eher die These, dass es Wahlzyklen in Bezug auf 
politische Entscheidungen als in Bezug auf makroökonomische Effekte gibt. 
Dennoch gibt es auch für Politikzyklen in Vor-Wahl-Perioden keine eindeutige 
Bestätigung. In der vorliegenden Veröffentlichung belegen wir neuere 
Argumente, die zeigen, dass die Begründung hierfür in der Missachtung des 
politischen, ökonomischen und institutionellen Kontextes liegt, in dem Politiker 
politische Entscheidungen treffen. Wir belegen insbesondere, dass der Grad 
der politischen Zersplitterung der Regierung sowohl den Bedarf nach als auch 
die Möglichkeit zu opportunistischen Politikzyklen beeinflusst. Eine Analyse von 
Daten zur kommunalen Verschuldung von 296 flämischen Gemeinden liefert die 
empirische Untermauerung für diese Behauptung. 
                                                 
*  The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments from Bruno Heyndels, Jan Vermeir and an 
anonymous referee.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Early in the legislative term, governments tend to follow relatively austere policies 
while the later years of the term often show considerable generosity on the part of 
incumbents.  This ‘predictable pattern of policy’ aims to improve one’s chances of re-
election (Nordhaus, 1975: 187).  Alterations in macro-economic policies such as to 
affect economic growth, unemployment and inflation (referred to as Political Business 
Cycles) are one possibility to reach this goal.  Adjustments in fiscal policies such as tax 
rates, expenditure patterns and so on are another (referred to as Political Budget Cycles). 
 
Theoretically, Political Budget Cycles require motive and opportunity (Tufte, 1978).  
They are thus likely to be stronger when there is more need for them (that is, when re-
election is uncertain) and when the incumbent has the political ability to manipulate 
policy.  As the level of government fragmentation affects both these elements (e.g. 
Boix, 1997; Mueller, 2003), it follows that government fragmentation may influence the 
tendency of incumbents to ‘electioneer’.  Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, 
only three studies take up this issue (Goodhart, 2002; Ashworth and Heyndels, 2002; 
Huber et al., 2003).  All three use country-level data and provide supportive evidence of 
the idea that political fragmentation affects the incentive to ‘electioneer’. 
 
We extend previous work in two main ways.  Firstly, analyse debt data from 296 
Flemish municipalities (1977-2000) and thus focus on local rather than national 
governments.  This has the advantage of allowing us to analyse opportunistic behaviour 
in an institutionally homogenous setting.  Secondly, we explicitly test whether the 
number of coalition partners influences the Political Budget Cycle (rather than 
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restricting ourselves to an analysis of coalitions versus one-party governments as in 
previous work).  Consideration of the number of parties in the coalition is important, as 
this has been shown to affect the ease of decision-making (e.g. Velasco, 2000; 
Ashworth et al., 2005, 2006). 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 reviews the literature on 
Political Budget Cycles and shows how political fragmentation may affect these cycles.  
The Flemish institutional setting and data are presented in section 2.  Section 3 contains 
the empirical analysis while section 4 concludes. 
 
1. POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND GOVERNMENT FRAGMENTATION 
 
1.1.  Political Budget Cycles 
 
The literature on Political Budget Cycles argues that politicians ‘seek to synchronize the 
timing of economic benefits and government profligacy with elections’ (Petry et al., 
1999: 273).  The reason is that high growth rates, low unemployment and/or 
government profligacy increase the incumbent government’s popularity and thereby its 
chance of re-election.  This is important as holding office is assumed to be the prime 
concern of politicians in these models (Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978; Alesina et al., 
1997).  That is, politicians are driven by opportunistic rather than ideological 
motivations.1
 
Early theoretical models explaining election-driven policy cycles rested on the 
assumption that voters are backward-looking, myopic and incapable of learning 
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(Alesina et al., 1997).  Under these assumptions, politicians can affect the voter’s 
judgement by making popular changes in policies close to the election (Franzese, 2002).  
Moreover, since voters do not learn from previous experiences, they can be fooled over 
and over again.  These assumptions are, however, not very satisfactory from a 
conceptual point of view.  Later models therefore assume rational expectations on the 
part of the voter (e.g. Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 
1990 and Persson and Tabellini, 1990).  Still, political cycles persist under the (critical) 
assumption that politicians have an information advantage over voters about their 
competence level.  Competence can be defined as the ability to reduce waste in the 
budget process (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990), promote growth without 
inflation (Persson and Tabellini, 1990) or insulate the economy from random shocks 
(Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986).  The information asymmetry entails that ‘the 
incumbent government has an incentive to signal its competence by engaging in pre-
electoral manipulations of policy instruments’ (Alesina et al., 1992: 3). 
 
Empirically, electoral cycles in public policies are widely acknowledged by the general 
public.  There is also a vast scientific literature on the subject.  As an excellent review is 
available in Franzese (2002), we here only briefly run over the main findings.  Firstly, 
policy adjustments to influence the voter’s decision-making are relatively well-
established.  This holds strongest for direct transfers, but also for tax cuts (or delayed 
increases), spending increases (or delayed cuts) and public hiring (or delayed firing).  
Support for such cycles is somewhat more robust in developing democracies relative to 
developed countries (Block, 2003).  Secondly, evidence for pre-electoral shifts in real 
outcomes (i.e. economic growth, unemployment and/or inflation) is at best ambiguous 
(Franzese, 2002).  Hence, the evidence for electoral cycles is clearly stronger for 
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changes in policies than in real outcomes.  Finally, it has been argued that the incentives 
to ‘electioneer’ are dependent upon the political, economic, institutional, structural and 
strategic context in which incumbents make policy.  Some supportive evidence of this 
has been presented, but the ‘crucial variation in the contexts’ has generally been 
‘underemphasized’ (Franzese, 2002: 369). 
 
1.2.  Influence of government fragmentation 
 
We contend that the level of government fragmentation may affect the extent of 
opportunistic political behaviour.  Political fragmentation is thereby defined as the 
dispersion of political power.  This not only refers to coalition governments, but also to 
cases of ‘divided government’ (i.e. when different parties control the executive and 
legislative branch of the government).  To derive theoretical arguments why 
government fragmentation might influence the prevalence of electoral cycles, we start 
from Tufte’s (1978) description of ‘electioneering’ as a murder mystery where 
politicians need weapon, motive and opportunity.  Two sets of weapons have generally 
been regarded: monetary policy and fiscal policy.  While monetary policy is (at best) 
only available for national governments, adjustments in fiscal policy are attainable at 
any level of government.  The motive is re-election.  This implies that the more 
uncertain re-election is, the higher the likelihood that politicians attempt to persuade 
voters.  Finally, opportunity has two key aspects.  It requires that governments have 
(perfect) knowledge about the timing of elections.  Fine-tuning policy decisions to one’s 
electoral needs can only be efficient if the incumbent knows well in advance when 
elections take place.  It also entails that the government has the ‘political opportunity’ to 
change its policy.  It should thus have some degree of autonomy and political power. 
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 From this murder mystery approach, two arguments can be derived relating government 
fragmentation to the electoral cycle.  On the one hand, government fragmentation 
affects the political opportunity to manipulate policy.  Fragmented governments are 
more likely to face indecisiveness and gridlock (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Boix, 1997).  
Game theory holds that this indecisiveness is likely to worsen with the number of 
parties (de Haan and Sturm, 1997).  In other words, manipulation of policy may be 
easier for strong, one-party governments and become more difficult the larger the 
number of parties.  Moreover, Powell and Whitten (1993) argue that it is easier to 
ascribe the state of the economy (and pre-electoral fiscal ‘presents’) to a one-party 
majority government than to a party in a coalition.  This lowers the incentive for parties 
in a coalition to embark on pre-electoral manoeuvres to increase their popularity.2  Both 
arguments lead to the hypothesis that electoral cycles are less likely when the 
government is more fragmented.  
 
On the other hand, legislative uncertainty is positively related to government 
fragmentation (see Mueller, 2003).  Fragmented governments have on average a shorter 
tenure and, given the uncertainty involved in the coalition formation process, the 
political future of parties in a coalition is less clear-cut than that of one-party majorities.  
This higher uncertainty for parties in a coalition leads to the hypothesis that fragmented 
governments may indulge in more prominent pre-electoral cycles.  Moreover, parties in 
a coalition do not fully internalise the fiscal costs of their actions (given a common pool 
of resources) (Weingast et al., 1981; Velasco, 2000).  This leads to higher expenditure 
levels and – to the extent that a similar reasoning holds for election-driven expenditure 
programs – to a steeper rise in pre-electoral expenditure under fragmented governments.  
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Finally, Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Tabellini and 
Alesina (1990) argue that uncertainty about future government participation may create 
an incentive to limit the policy options of future governments by strategically increasing 
public debt prior to elections.  Fragmented governments, being more uncertain of future 
legislative power (cfr. supra), may thus aim for higher levels of debt prior to elections in 
order to compromise future governments.   
 
To the best of our knowledge, only three analyses regard the effect of political 
fragmentation on Political Budget Cycles.  Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) explore 
year-to-year changes in tax structures in 18 OECD countries (1965-95).  They show that 
fragmented and one-party minority governments witness stronger changes in their tax 
structure in election years compared to one-party majority governments.3  Goodhart 
(2002) analyses monetary policy in 17 countries (1973-92).  She finds that an electoral 
cycle in quarterly money growth exists for one-party governments, but not for coalition 
governments.   Finally, Huber et al. (2003) analyse public deficits in OECD countries 
(1970-99).  They show that an election only significantly affects budget deficits in the 
full sample, but not when the sample is restricted to coalition governments.4   
 
2. MUNICIPAL POLICY: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Flemish municipalities are governed by the local council (the legislative body) and the 
College of Mayor and Aldermen (the executive body).  Whereas the Aldermen are 
selected from among the councillors, the councillors are nominated through democratic 
elections.  These take place once every six years on the second Sunday of October.  
Hence, while local politicians cannot choose the date of the election to match positive 
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economic circumstances, they are aware of the timing of the elections and might be 
tempted to influence (fiscal) policies to increase their popularity. 
 
A system of Proportional Representation (i.e. ‘highest averages Imperiali’) is used to 
allocate seats in these municipal elections.  Such proportional systems are thought to be 
conducive to higher levels of political fragmentation (Duverger, 1954/1972).  Table 1 
reveals that this also holds for Flemish local governments (see also Geys, 2006).  This 
table represents the number of municipalities where one to five parties (i.e. the 
maximum observed over the period under study) gained representation in the College of 
Mayor and Aldermen over the latest five municipal elections (1976 up to 2000).  The 
average number of parties across the municipalities is also indicated for each legislative 
term (along with the standard deviation).  However, while there are 308 Flemish 
municipalities, data availability forces us to preclude 12 of these from the analysis 
(leaving 296 municipalities – see below).  For comparability, we therefore only discuss 
the government composition in these 296 municipalities.  Note, finally, that the number 
of parties in the College can only vary when the composition of the government 
changes.  Unlike at the federal level, this will – under normal circumstances – only 
happen following new municipal elections or once every six years.   
_______________ 
Table 1 
about here 
_______________ 
 
Table 1 illustrates that the average number of parties with representation in the College 
of Mayor and Alderman has witnessed a rise from 1.47 to 1.87 parties between the 
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elections of 1976 and 2000.  However, there is no uniform upward trend.  The elections 
of 1988 led to a decline in the fragmentation of Flemish municipal governments, but the 
following two elections (1994 and 2000) more than made up for this decline.  There is 
also considerable variation between municipalities.  For example, after the 2000 
municipal elections, almost one in three municipalities has a one-party majority.  Little 
over half of the municipalities are governed by a two-party coalition and the remaining 
local governments are presided by ‘large coalitions’ (containing three or more parties).   
 
It is of interest to note here that the number of parties in the College is weakly positively 
related to the size of the municipality (r=0.22).  Larger municipalities are somewhat less 
likely to be governed by a one-party majority.  Also, there is a relatively weak negative 
correlation between the number of parties in the College and the ideological position of 
the government (r=-0.30).5  This reflects the historical – though waning – supremacy of 
the Christian Democrats (CD&V) at the local government level.  They are positioned in 
the ideological centre and have tended to cooperate more often with the socialist party 
(SP.a) on their left than with the liberal party (VLD) on their right.  Finally, there is the 
issue of government (in)stability over time.  Unfortunately, our data only allow us to 
observe which parties are in power in a given period.  Yet, political parties at the local 
level in Flanders frequently split up, merge, form (temporary) cartels, disappear or 
simply change their name between consecutive elections.  Still, this does not necessarily 
affect the politicians in power (such that party instability and government instability do 
not need to coincide).  As it is often extremely difficult to determine links between 
parties in successive elections in the same municipality (see also Vermeir and Heyndels, 
2006), an in-depth analysis of local government instability was not possible with the 
current data and is therefore left for future research. 
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 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1. Empirical model  
 
Our empirical analysis concentrates on real long-term municipal debts in 296 Flemish 
municipalities over the period 1977-2000 (in 2000 prices).6  We use long-term debts as 
these indicate most closely the municipality’s financial position, while short-term loans 
may merely reflect temporary imbalances.  Moreover, we only consider loans for which 
the financial burden falls on the municipal government, viz. so-called ‘own share’ loans.  
These represent more than 95 per cent of the total loan volume in 2000 (Dexia, 2001).  
Still, two other types of loans exist.  For ‘government share’ loans the burden of interest 
and amortisation is borne by a higher-level government.  ‘Third party’ or ‘pass-through’ 
loans are arranged for and repaid by a third party (e.g. church fabrics).  Both are 
excluded from the present analysis, however, as they imply no budgetary consequences 
for the municipality arranging the loan.   
 
We estimate the following regression model (subscripts for time and municipalities 
dropped for convenience): 
 
  = a + bDebt∂ 1 + bPop∂ 2 Inc∂ + b3 Cost∂  + b4 Dexia + b5 BBR + b6 ICG + 
b7 FRAG + b8 ELECT + b9 ELECT*FRAG + e 
 
The dependent variable is the year-on-year growth rate of real long-term municipal 
debts in municipality i at time t (in 2000 prices) (cfr. Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2005).  
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As explanatory variables, we first of all include the growth rate of real per capita taxable 
income ( ; in 2000 prices) and the growth rate of the population ( ).  These 
variables capture demand side effects as increases in income and/or population are 
likely to lead to an additional demand for public expenditures (which may be at least 
partly financed by debt).  Secondly, we introduce the year-to-year change in the real 
interest rate on long-term (federal) government bonds to measure changes in the cost of 
borrowing.  Increasing costs of borrowing can be expected to decrease debt financing by 
rational governments (Clingermayer and Wood, 1995).  Note that this variable only 
changes over time but not across municipalities. It can thus only explain within 
municipality variation and not between municipality variation. 
Inc∂ Pop∂
 
The ‘Dexia’-variable controls for the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of Dexia Bank in 
1996 (and is defined as a dummy equal to 1 in the year of the IPO and 0 otherwise).  
The municipalities, being prime shareholders of this financial institution, obtained large 
capital inflows from this event.  Adhering to the ‘advice’ of the Flemish Regional 
Government to use at least 80 per cent of the IPO’s benefits for debt reduction, 
municipal governments reduced their debts with roughly € 19 million via these capital 
inflows (Dexia, 1998).  BBR is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the period after 1982 
when a Balanced Budget Rule for all Belgian municipalities was imposed by the federal 
government.  As such rules are often argued (and found) to be effective in limiting debts 
and deficits (see Kirchgässner, 2003), we expect the coefficient of this variable to bear a 
negative sign.  As a last control variable, ICG is introduced as a measure for the 
ideological position of the local government (see footnote 5).  This assesses the effect of 
partisan influences on fiscal outcomes (Cusack, 1997; Bräuniger, 2005). 
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The central interest of our analysis lies, however, in the effect of elections and political 
fragmentation on municipal indebtedness.  FRAG is a vector of two dummy variables: 
the first equals 1 where only one party is represented in the College of Mayor and 
Aldermen and 0 otherwise and the second equals 1 where two parties are represented 
(‘large’ coalitions being the reference category).  These variables test whether 
government fragmentation as such affects local indebtedness (and should be included to 
avoid biased inferences on the interaction effect with the election dummies, see below).  
To measure the effect of elections, we introduce a variable ELECT, which takes two 
different forms.  Both definitions assume that voters react to observable changes in 
fiscal policy (and not to budget proposals).  The first definition includes only years in 
which the election actually falls: 1982-1988-1994-2000.  This will be termed ‘1 year’ in 
the following and is supported by the fact that the elections always take place near the 
end of the year (Alesina et al., 1992; Van Driessche and Heyndels, 1999).  The second 
definition also incorporates the year before the election in the election year variable.  
This is termed ‘2 years’.  The idea here is that election-induced adjustments in fiscal 
policy are not limited to the year of the election, but might already occur the year prior 
to the election.  This is not unlikely given the fixed 6-year legislative term (implying 
perfect knowledge of election dates).  Finally, to judge whether the election effect – if 
present – differs with respect to the number of parties in the College, we include an 
interaction term between FRAG and ELECT.   
 
3.2. Empirical results 
 
Given that we have observations for 296 municipalities over 24 years (N=7104), we 
estimate the model using standard panel regression techniques.  The findings are 
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brought together in table 4.  Columns (1) and (2) present the results when restricting the 
election year variable to the year of the election (‘1 year’) while columns (3) and (4) 
give the results when the election year variable comprises also the year prior to the 
election (‘2 years’).  In each case, uneven numbered columns present the results without 
the interaction term and even numbered columns introduce the interaction term between 
government fragmentation and the election dummy.  As the Hausman specification test 
indicated that random effects estimation dominated over fixed effects estimation (see 
bottom row of table 4), only the results of the random effects estimations are presented.   
_______________ 
Table 2 
about here 
_______________ 
 
Let us begin by briefly discussing the findings for our control variables.  Population and 
income growth are positively related to growth in local public debts (though the latter 
finding is not robust over the various specifications).  This is in line with the idea that 
larger and wealthier populations demand more (debt-financed) public expenditures.  
Still, as both coefficients are well below 1, the growth rate of debt is lower than the 
growth rate of population and income.  Surprisingly, increasing interest rates positively 
affect the debt growth rate.  This is at odds with the idea that rational governments 
would decrease their borrowing when interest rates rise.  However, it may derive from 
the so-called ‘snowball effect’, which states that excessive debt levels can become self-
reinforcing when interest rates are high enough.7  As expected, the Initial Public 
Offering of Dexia Bank in 1996 (DEXIA) and the introduction of the balanced budget 
rule (BBR) both significantly negatively affect the growth rate of local public 
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indebtedness.  Finally, the growth rate of local public debt is higher under more right-
wing governments (though this effect is only weakly significant).  
 
Turning to the central variables of the analysis, it can be seen that the growth rate of 
local public debt is significantly higher in election years (whether defined as ‘1 year’ or 
‘2 years’).  This confirms a standard finding in the public choice literature and a 
characteristic of local public finances that is widely acknowledged among the general 
population.  With respect to the effect of government fragmentation, columns (1) and 
(3) indicate that, taken over the entire time period, debt growth is not significantly 
different between one-party governments and ‘large’ coalitions (containing three or 
more parties), but that the two-party coalitions tend to witness a significantly higher 
growth rate of local public debt than these ‘large’ coalitions.  Wald tests furthermore 
indicate that the difference between the coefficients for one- and two-party governments 
is not statistically significant (Chi² (1) = 0.82; p>0.10 for ‘1 year’ and Chi² (1) = 0.83; 
p>0.10 for ‘2 years’).   
 
Still, an interesting pattern arises when introducing the interaction effect in columns (2) 
and (4).  This shows that in non-election years, both one- and two-party coalitions have 
significantly higher debt growth rates than ‘large’ coalitions (as the coefficients of both 
fragmentation variables now are statistically significantly different from 0).  In election 
years, however, the growth rate of local public debt is lower for one-party governments 
compared to ‘large’ coalitions.  This effect is obtained by adding the coefficient for the 
interaction effect to that of the fragmentation variable and is statistically significant in 
‘2 years’ (Chi² (1) = 2.72; p<0.10), but not for ‘1 year’ (Chi² (1) = 0.68; p>0.10).  Also, 
two-party coalitions do not differ significantly from ‘large’ coalitions in election years 
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(while they had a higher debt growth than such governments in non-election years, see 
above).  Finally, one-party and two-party governments do not significantly differ from 
one another in non election years (Chi² (1) = 0.01; p>0.10 for ‘1 year’ and Chi² (1) = 
0.86; p>0.10 for ‘2 years’), but two-party governments do have significantly higher debt 
growth than one-party governments when elections are imminent (Chi² (1) = 5.26; 
p<0.05 for ‘1 year’ and Chi² (1) = 8.77; p<0.01 for ‘2 years’).   
 
Taking all these results together suggests that the election-driven rise in debt growth 
rates is affected by the number of parties in the College of Mayor and Aldermen.  This 
can more clearly be seen when we represent the results graphically in figure 1. In this 
figure, we show the average year-to-year growth rate of real local public debt on the y-
axis, while the x-axis separates election from non-election years.  For simplicity, we 
only present the results for ‘2 years’.  It is clear that the growth rate of municipal 
indebtedness in election years is higher than in non-election years for all government 
types (indicating a significant election effect for all three levels of government 
fragmentation).  Secondly, figure 1 illustrates that the election-year hike increases with 
the number of parties in the College of Mayor and Aldermen.  That is, the steepness of 
the lines in figure 1 rises with the level of political fragmentation.  Interestingly, 
however, the increase is clearly strongest when moving from one- to two-party 
governments.  This suggests that the larger ‘motive’ to electioneer may be countered by 
decreasing political ‘opportunities’ to engage in opportunistic behaviour when the 
coalition becomes larger. 
_______________ 
Figure1 
about here 
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_______________ 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The literature on Political Business (and Budget) Cycles suggests that incumbents’ 
desire to be re-elected induces a ‘predictable pattern of policy’ over the legislative term 
(Nordhaus, 1975: 187).  Though empirical evidence is stronger for electoral cycles in 
policies than in macro-economic outcomes, the literature to date is far from unanimous.  
A recent argument holds that this may be due to a disregard for the political, economic 
and institutional context in which politicians make policy decisions (Franzese, 2002).  
In the present paper, we followed this line of argument by pointing to the level of 
government fragmentation as an intermediary factor in opportunistic political behaviour.  
Specifically, we argued that the level of government fragmentation affects both the need 
for (‘motive’) and the possibility to engage in electoral policy cycles (‘opportunity’).   
 
Using a dataset of local public debt in 296 Flemish municipalities (1977-2000), we find 
support for the intermediary role of political fragmentation on incumbents’ 
‘electioneering’.  Specifically, we show that the election-year hike in debt growth rates 
increases with the number of parties in the College of Mayor and Aldermen in Flemish 
municipalities.  We argue that the greater political uncertainty faced by parties in a 
coalition government is an important element to explain this finding.  Nonetheless, 
while there is a strong increase in the election-year rise in debt growth between one- and 
two-party governments, the additional increase is much more modest when we 
subsequently move to ‘large’ coalitions (consisting of three or more parties).  This 
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suggests that the larger ‘motive’ may be countered by decreasing political 
‘opportunities’ to engage in opportunistic behaviour when the coalition becomes larger. 
 
It is important to note that our results are at odds with the findings of Goodhart (2002) 
and Huber et al. (2003).  Using cross-country data, they show that active intervention in 
fiscal or monetary policy in election years is harder for more fragmented governments.  
One possible explanation for this difference is that the incentives and opportunities to 
indulge in opportunistic behaviour are different for parties in a coalition government at 
the local level than at the national level.  Two reasons can be brought forward.  The first 
is that national and local governments have different responsibilities.  Following the 
subsidiarity principle (Oates, 1972), national governments are responsible for general 
areas of public provisions such as national security and the welfare system.  Local 
governments mostly provide public goods with geographically restricted benefits such 
as parks and the local road infrastructure.  This specific nature of the local governments’ 
responsibilities might make it easier to award specific groups in the population with 
clearly identifiable benefits prior to elections.  Secondly, and possibly more important, 
the closer link between local parties and the electorate allows all parties to claim credit 
for their actions.8  Hence, the largest party is less likely to be given complete 
recognition (as found by Goodhart [2002] for national governments) and all parties in 
the coalition have an incentive to engage in pre-electoral opportunistic behaviour.  
Under such circumstances, the electoral cycle is likely to become more pronounced with 
the number of parties in the coalition at the local government level. 
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Table 1: Political fragmentation in Flemish municipalities (N = 296) 
 
 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 
1 party 178 122 136 116 92 
2 parties 98 125 129 144 156 
3 parties 19 42 27 29 42 
4 parties 1 6 3 7 6 
5 parties 0 1 1 0 0 
 
Average 1.47 1.78 1.66 1.75 1.87 
Standard deviation 0.63 0.79 0.71 0.72 0.72 
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 Table 2: Panel regression estimation results 
Variable (1) 
‘1 year’ 
(2) 
‘1 year’ 
(3) 
‘2 years’ 
(4) 
‘2 years’ 
Intercept -0.636 
(-0.39) 
-0.828 
(-0.50) 
-1.492 
(-0.91) 
-2.152 
(-1.30) 
Population growth 0.497 *** 
(3.21) 
0.498 *** 
(3.22) 
0.545 *** 
(3.53) 
0.541 *** 
(3.50) 
Income growth -0.003 
(-0.06) 
0.005 
(0.10) 
0.087 * 
(1.72) 
0.089 * 
(1.75) 
Interest rate change 0.001 ** 
(2.02) 
0.001 ** 
(2.10) 
0.001 * 
(1.89) 
0.001 ** 
(2.03) 
DEXIA -5.016 *** 
(-6.09) 
-4.995 *** 
(-6.07) 
-4.452 *** 
(-5.39) 
-4.392 *** 
(-5.32) 
BBR -1.353 *** 
(-3.32) 
-1.351 *** 
(-3.32) 
-1.205 *** 
(-2.97) 
-1.225 *** 
(-3.02) 
ICG 0.546 * 
(1.65) 
0.548 * 
(1.65) 
0.526 
(1.59) 
0.525 
(1.59) 
One party government 0.697 
(1.25) 
1.054 * 
(1.73) 
0.690 
(1.24) 
1.808 *** 
(2.69) 
Two party coalition 1.026 * 
(1.89) 
1.056 * 
(1.78) 
1.020 * 
(1.88) 
1.404 ** 
(2.12) 
Election dummy 3.124 *** 
(7.09) 
4.195 *** 
(3.26) 
3.278 *** 
(9.29) 
5.323 *** 
(5.25) 
One party * Election - -2.145 
(-1.49) 
- -3.353 *** 
(-2.97) 
Two parties * Election - -0.186 
(-0.13) 
- -1.152 
(-1.01) 
 
Wald (full model) 
Hausman 
 
136.40 *** 
1.61 
 
141.70 *** 
1.58 
 
172.84 *** 
1.05 
 
186.80 *** 
1.06 
Note: N = 7104 (296*24); t-statistics between brackets; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** 
at 1% (two-tailed tests); Wald (full model) tests the joint significance of all variables in 
the model while Hausman assesses the use of random versus fixed effects. 
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of results (‘2 years’) 
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∑ =ni ii Complexionp1 ).(
1  Hibbs (1977) has argued that politicians are driven by ideological policy objectives.  Frey and 
Schneider (1978a, b) point to the possibility that ideological motives are central early in the 
legislative term while opportunistic motivations tend to take the upper-hand when elections are 
imminent. 
2  Goodhart (2002) shows that only the largest party in the coalition benefits from improved economic 
performance while smaller coalition partners may lose support.  Hence, these small coalition partners 
have little incentive to manipulate policy prior to elections. 
3  They interpret this as evidence that active intervention to offset ‘automatic’ changes in the tax system 
is harder for more fragmented governments.  This result, however, is also compatible with the idea 
that fragmented governments may counter their political uncertainty by more extensive changes in 
the tax system prior to elections. 
4  Related to this work, there is a growing body of literature looking at the intermediary effect of 
political fragmentation on various politico-economic phenomena.  Alesina et al. (1997), for example, 
find that partisan effects on government policy and economic outcomes are clearer in two-party/bloc 
systems than in multi-party/bloc systems.  Tovmo and Falch (2002: 153) show that the flypaper 
effect (i.e. the finding that grants have a larger effect on government expenditures than income) ‘may 
be a result of weak political leadership’.  Lane (2003: 2661) finds that countries with ‘dispersed 
political power are the most likely to run procyclical fiscal policies’.  Finally, Kontopoulos and 
Perotti (1999) and Ashworth and Heyndels (2005) uncover that political fragmentation affects the 
asymmetry in the reactions of governments to budgetary ‘good’ and ‘bad’ times. 
5  The government’s ideological position (ICG) is defined as the weighted average position of the 
coalition parties on a scale from 0 (extreme Left) to 10 (extreme Right): i.e. 
, where n is the number of parties in the College of Mayor and Aldermen, pi 
is the seat share of party i in the College and Complexion refers to the ideological position of this 
party on a classic Left-Right scale (from 0 to 10).  The data concerning a party’s ideological position 
were obtained from Deschouwer (1996).  They are based on a self-placement survey and were 
obtained by asking presidents and spokesmen of the parties in the municipalities to locate their party 
on an ideological scale between 0 (Left) and 10 (Right).  The figures range from 2.6 (Agalev) to 6.1 
(VLD). 
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6  The data were extracted from appendix 14 of the municipal budgets (for 1977-94) and obtained from 
Dexia Bank (for 1995-2000).  We had to remove 10 municipalities due to incomplete data-series.  
Moreover, Antwerp and Ghent were removed as they obtained sizeable reorganisation loans from the 
federal ‘hulpfonds tot financieel herstel van de gemeenten’ during the mid-1980s.  This leaves us 296 
Flemish municipalities. 
7  Formally, it can be shown that debt will necessarily increase when the interest rate is higher than the 
nominal growth rate of taxable income unless a sufficiently large primary surplus (that is, surplus of 
revenue over non-interest expenditures) is created (Moesen and Van Rompuy, 1997).  As this 
snowball effect mainly arises in times of extreme budgetary stress, we re-estimated our model for the 
period 1984-2000.  While local public indebtedness in Flanders had become problematic by the late 
1970s, the situation was drastically improved by 1984 (Moesen and Van Damme, 1994).  While 
leaving the other coefficients largely unaffected, this change in the time period does give a significant 
negative coefficient for the interest rate variable (results available upon request). 
8  Note that this closer link could make it harder for incumbents at the local level to ‘mislead’ the 
electorate or decrease the need for signalling ones competence.  This would imply that electoral 
cycles may be weaker at the local than at the federal level. 
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